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Abstract
This paper contributes to the program of numerical characterisation and classification of
simple games outlined in the classical monograph of von Neumann and Morgenstern [22]. One
of the most fundamental questions of this program is what makes a simple game a weighted
majority game. The necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee weightedness were
obtained by Elgot [3] and refined by Taylor and Zwicker [19]. If a simple game does not have
weights, then rough weights may serve as a reasonable substitute (see their use in Taylor and
Zwicker [21]). A simple game is roughly weighted if there exists a system of weights and a
threshold such that all coalitions whose combined weight is above the threshold are winning
and all coalitions whose combined weight is below the threshold are losing and a tie-breaking
is needed to classify the coalitions whose combined weight is exactly the threshold. Not all
simple games are roughly weighted, and the class of projective games [16] is a prime example.
In this paper we give necessary and sufficient conditions for a simple game to have rough
weights. We define two functions f(n) and g(n) that measure the deviation of a simple
game from a weighted majority game and roughly weighted majority game, respectively. We
formulate known results in terms of lower and upper bounds for these functions and improve
those bounds. We also investigate rough weightedness of simle games with a small number
of players.
1 Introduction
In the classical book [22] von Neumann and Morgenstern outlined the programme of numerical
classification and characterisation of all simple games.1 They viewed the introduction of weighted
majority games as the first step in this direction. They noted however2 that already for six
players not all games have weighted majority representation and they also noted that for seven
players some games do not have weighted majority representation in a much stronger sense.
Therefore one of the most fundamental questions of this programme is to find out what makes a
simple game a weighted majority game. The next step is to measure the deviation of an arbitrary
1See Section 50.2.1, page 433 of the Third Edition.
2Section 5.3 of the same book
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game from a weighted majority game in terms of a certain function f(n) of the number of players
n and to obtain lower and upper bounds for this function.
The necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee weightedness of a game are known.
Elgot [3] obtained them in terms of asummability. Taylor and Zwicker [19] obtained necessary
and sufficient conditions later but independently in terms of trading transforms. The advantage
of the latter characterisation is that it is constructive in the sense that only finitely many
conditions (which depends on the number of players) has to be checked to decide if the game
is weighted or not. More precisely, they showed that a simple game is weighted majority game
if no sequence of winning coalitions up to the length 22
n
can be converted into a sequence of
losing coalitions by exchanging players.
The sequence of coalitions
T = (X1, . . . ,Xj ;Y1, . . . , Yj) (1)
is called a trading transform if the coalitions X1, . . . ,Xj can be converted into the coalitions
Y1, . . . , Yj by rearranging players. If game G with n players does not have weights, then the
characterisation of Taylor and Zwicker implies that there exists a trading transform (1) where all
X1, . . . ,Xj are winning and all Y1, . . . , Yj are losing. We call such a trading transform a certificate
of non-weightedness. We denote the minimal length j of such a certificate T as f(G) and set
f(n) = maxG f(G), where G runs over all games without weighted majority representation.
A discussion about the nature of this function is in order. If f(G) = 2, then the game G is
extremely non-weighted, in fact most games, as noted in [21], are of this kind. And it is easy
to find a certificate of their non-weightedness. Games with the condition f(G) > 2 behave in
some respects as weighted games, in particular the desirability relation on singletons is a weak
order (this is why they are called complete games [1, 21]). For such games Carreras and Freixas
[1, 21, 6] obtained a useful classification result. So the larger f(G) the closer the game G to
weighted majority games. And it is not surprising that it gets more and more difficult to find
a certificate of their non-weightedness. It is important to know what is the maximal length of
certificates that has to be checked in order to declare that G is weighted. The function f(n)
shows exactly this length. This is a complete analogue to the Fishburn’s function f(n) defined
for linear qualitative probability orders [4].
Many old results can be nicely expressed in terms of this function. In particular the results
of Taylor and Zwicker [19, 20] (and earlier Gabelman [7] for small values of n) can be presented
as lower and upper bounds for f(n) as follows
⌊√n⌋ ≤ f(n) ≤ 22n . (2)
In this paper we improve both bounds as follows:⌊
n− 1
2
⌋
≤ f(n) ≤ (n+ 1)2 12n log2 n. (3)
2
If a simple game does not have weights, then rough weights may serve as a reasonable
substitute (see [21]). The idea is the same as in the use of tie-breaking in voting in case when
only one alternative is to be elected. If the combined weight of a coalition is greater than a
certain threshold, then it is winning, if the combined weight is smaller than the threshold, then
this coalition is losing. If its weight is exactly the threshold, then it can go either way depending
on the “tie-breaking” rule.
In this paper we obtain a necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of rough
weights. We prove that a game G is roughly weighted majority game if for no j smaller than
(n+ 1)2
1
2
n log2 n there exist a certificate of non-weightedness of length j with the grand coalition
among winning coalitions and the empty coalition among losing coalitions. Let us call such
certificates potent. For a game G without rough weights we define by g(G) the lengths of the
shortest potent certificate of non-weightedness. Then, a function g(n) can be naturally defined
which is fully analogous to f(n). It shows the maximal length of potent certificates that has to
be checked in order to decide if G is roughly weighted or not. One of the main result of this
paper can be formulated in terms of function g(n) as follows:
2n+ 3 ≤ g(n) < (n + 1)2 12n log2 n. (4)
We prove the lower bound by constructing examples.
We also study rough weightedness of small games. We show that all games with n ≤ 4
players, all strong and proper games with n ≤ 5 players and all constant-sum games with n ≤ 6
players are roughly weighted. Thus the smallest constant sum game that is not roughly weighted
is the game with seven players obtained from the Fano plane [22], page 470. This game is the
smallest representative of the class of projective games [16]. One of the consequences of our
characterisation is that all projective games do not have rough weights.
2 Definitions and examples
Let us consider a finite set P consisting of n elements which we will call players. For convenience
P can be taken to be [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Definition 1. A simple game is a pair G = (P,W ), where W is a subset of the power set 2P
which satisfies the monotonicity condition:
if X ∈W and X ⊂ Y ⊆ P , then Y ∈W .
We also require that W is different from ∅ and P (non-triviality assumption).
Elements of the set W are called winning coalitions. We also define the set L = 2P \W and
call elements of this set losing coalitions. A winning coalition is said to be minimal if every its
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proper subset is a losing coalition. Due to monotonicity, every simple game is fully determined
by the set of its minimal winning coalitions.
For X ⊆ P we will denote its complement P \X as Xc.
Definition 2. A simple game is called proper if X ∈ W implies that Xc ∈ L and strong if
X ∈ L implies that Xc ∈W . A simple game which is proper and strong is called a constant sum
game.
In a constant sum game there are exactly 2n−1 winning coalitions and exactly the same
number of losing ones.
Definition 3. A simple game G is called weighted majority game if there exist non-negative
reals w1, . . . , wn, and a positive real number q, called quota, such that X ∈ W iff
∑
i∈X wi ≥ q.
Such game is denoted [q;w1, . . . , wn]. We also call [q;w1, . . . , wn] as a voting representation for
G.
Example 1 ([6]). The UN Security Council consists of five permanent and 10 non-permanent
countries. A passage requires approval of at least nine countries, subject to a veto by any one of
the permanent members. This is a weighted simple game with a voting representation
[39; 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].
Other interesting examples of simple games can be found in [21, 6].
As von Neumann and Morgenstern showed [22] all simple games with less than four, every
proper or strong simple game with less than five and every constant sum game with less than
six players has a voting representation. For six players the situation is different and there are
constant sum games with six players that are not weighted [22].
Example 2. Let n = 6. Let us include in W all sets of cardinality four or greater, 22 sets in
total. We want to construct a proper game, therefore we have to choose and include in W at most
one set out of each of the 10 pairs (X,Xc), where X is a subset of cardinality three. Suppose
we included sets X1 = {1, 2, 4}, X2 = {1, 3, 6}, X3 = {2, 3, 5}, X4 = {1, 4, 5}, X5 = {2, 5, 6},
X6 = {3, 4, 6} in W (and four other 3-element sets to insure that the game is constant sum).
If this game had a voting representation [q;w1, . . . , w6], then the following system of inequalities
must have a solution: ∑
i∈Xj
wi >
∑
i∈Xcj
wi, j = 1, . . . , 6. (5)
This system is nevertheless inconsistent.
However if we convert all six inequalities (5) into equalities, then there will be a 1-dimensional
solution space spanned by (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) which shows that this game “almost” have a voting
4
representation [3; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]. Indeed, if we assign weight 1 to every player, then all coalition
whose weight falls below the threshold 3 are in L, all coalitions whose total weight exceeds this
threshold are in W . However, if a coalition has total weight of three, i.e. it is equal to the
threshold, it can be either winning or losing.
Definition 4 ( [21], p.78). A simple game G is called roughly weighted if there exist non-
negative real numbers w1, . . . , wn and a real number q, called quota, not all equal to zero, such
that for X ∈ 2P the condition ∑i∈X wi < q implies X ∈ L, and ∑i∈X wi > q implies X ∈ W .
We say that [q;w1, . . . , wn] is a rough voting representation for G.
The simple game in Example 2 is roughly weighted with a rough voting representation
[3; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]. We will show later (Theorem 17) that any constant sum game with six players
has a rough voting representation. In threshold logic roughly weighted games correspond to
pseudo-threshold functions (see [15], p.208).
Example 3 (Fano plane game [22]). Let us denote P = [7] the set of points of the projective
plane of order two, called the Fano plane. Let P be the set of players of the new game. Let us
also take the seven lines of this projective plane as minimal winning coalitions:
{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}, {1, 5, 6}, {1, 4, 7}, {2, 5, 7}, {3, 6, 7}, {2, 4, 6}. (6)
We will denote them by X1, . . . ,X7, respectively. This, as it is easy to check, defines a constant
sum game, which we will denote Fano. If it had a rough voting representation [q;w1, . . . , w7],
then the following system of inequalities will be consistent:∑
i∈Xj
wi ≥
∑
i∈Xcj
wi, j = 1, . . . , 7. (7)
However adding all the equations up we get
∑7
i=1wi ≤ 0 which shows that this system does not
have solutions with non-negative coordinates other than the zero solution. Since all weights are
equal to zero, by the definition, the threshold must non-zero, coalitions (6) cannot be winning.
Hence this simple game is not roughly weighted.
3 Games and Ideals
Firstly we would like to redefine trading transforms algebraically. Let T = {−1, 0, 1} and
T n = T × T × . . . T (n times). With any pair (X,Y ) of subsets X,Y ∈ [n] we define
vX,Y = χ(X) − χ(Y ) ∈ T n,
where χ(X) and χ(Y ) are the characteristic vectors of subsets X and Y , respectively.
Let now G = (P,W ) be a game. We will associate an algebraic object with G. For any pair
(X,Y ), where X is winning and Y is losing, we put in correspondence the following vector vX,Y .
The set of all such vectors we will denote I(G).
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Definition 5. Let ei = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0), where the only nonzero element 1 is in the ith position.
Then a subset I ⊆ T n will be called an ideal in T n if for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n
(v ∈ I and v + ei ∈ T n) =⇒ v + ei ∈ I. (8)
Proposition 1. Let G be a game with n players. Then I(G) is an ideal in T n.
Proof. The condition (8) follows directly from the monotonicity condition for games. Indeed,
if vX,Y + ei is in T
n, then this amounts to either addition of i to X, which was not there, or
removal of i from Y . Both operations maintain X winning and Y losing.
We note that G can be uniquely recovered from I(G) only for proper games. The key to this
recovery is to consider all vectors from I(G) without zeros. Indeed, if X is winning coalition,
then Xc is losing and vX,Xc ∈ I(G). This vector does not contain zeros and X can be recovered
from it uniquely.
Proposition 2. Let G be a finite simple game. Then:
(a) G is weighted iff the system
v · x > 0, v ∈ I(G) (9)
has a solution.
(b) G is roughly weighted iff the system
v · x ≥ 0, v ∈ I(G) (10)
has a non-zero solution.
Proof. The proof of (a) is contained in [21] (see Lemma 2.6.5 and comment on page 6 why all
weights can be chosen non-negative).
Let us prove (b). Suppose G is roughly weighted, Let v = vX,Y ∈ I(G). Then X ∈ W ,
Y ∈ L and w = (w1, . . . , wn) satisfies∑
t∈X
wt ≥ q ≥
∑
s∈Y
ws. (11)
This implies
∑
t∈X wt −
∑
s∈Y ws ≥ 0 or v · w ≥ 0 and then w is a non-zero solution of (10)
(due to the non-triviality assumption).
On the other hand, any solution to the system of inequalities (9) gives us a vector of weights
and a threshold. Let w be such a solution. Then for any two coalitions X ∈ W , Y ∈ L we will
have vX,Y ·w ≥ 0 or ∑
t∈X
wt ≥
∑
s∈Y
ws.
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Then the smallest sum
∑
t∈X wt, where X ∈ W , will still be greater than or equal than the
largest sum
∑
s∈Y ws, where Y ∈ L. Hence the threshold q can be chosen between them so that∑
t∈X
wt ≥ q ≥
∑
s∈Y
ws.
The only problem left is that w can have negative components and in the definition of a roughly
weighted game all weights must be non-negative. However, due to the monotonicity, if the game
G has any rough weights, then it has a non-negative system of rough weights too (with the same
threshold). Indeed, if, say weight w1 of the first player is negative, then she cannot be pivotal in
any winning coalition. Since her weight is negative, her removal from a winning coalition cannot
make it losing. By monotonicity, deleting her from a losing coalition does not make it winning.
In this case the weight w1 can be reset to 0 (or a very small positive weight). We can do this
with every negative weight.
4 Trade-robustness and function f
We remind that a sequence of coalitions
T = (X1, . . . ,Xj ;Y1, . . . , Yj) (12)
is a trading transform if the coalitions X1, . . . ,Xj can be converted into the coalitions Y1, . . . , Yj
by rearranging players. It can also be expressed as
|{i : a ∈ Xi}| = |{i : a ∈ Yi}| for all a ∈ P .
It is worthwhile to note that while in (12) we can consider that no Xi coincides with any of Yk, it
is perfectly possible that the sequence X1, . . . ,Xj has some terms equal, the sequence Y1, . . . , Yj
can also contain equal subsets. The order of subsets in these sequences is not important, thus in
fact we deal with two multisets of coalitions. We will sometimes use the multiset notation and
instead of (12) will write
T = (Xa11 , . . . ,Xakk ;Y b11 , . . . , Y bmm ), (13)
where now X1, . . . ,Xk and Y1, . . . , Yk are all distinct, a1, . . . , ak and b1, . . . , bm are sequences of
positive integers such that
∑k
i=1 ai =
∑m
j=1 bj and Z
ci
i denotes ci copies of Zi with Zi ∈ {Xi, Yi},
ci ∈ {ai, bi}.
We also have the following obvious algebraic reformulation.
Proposition 3. Let X1, . . . ,Xj and Y1, . . . , Yj be two sequences of subsets of [n]. Then (12) is
a trading transform iff
vX1,Y1 + . . .+ vXj ,Yj = 0. (14)
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Definition 6. A simple game G is called k-trade robust if no trading transform (12) with j ≤ k
have all coalitions X1, . . . ,Xj winning and all Y1, . . . , Yj losing. G is trade robust if it is k-trade
robust for every k.
Proposition 4. A simple game G is k-trade robust if for no v1, . . . ,vm ∈ I(G) and for no
non-negative integers a1, . . . , am such that
∑m
I=1 ai ≤ k, we have
a1v1 + a2v2 + · · ·+ amvm = 0. (15)
Proof. Suppose G is not k-trade robust and there exists a trading transform (12) with Xi ∈W ,
Yi ∈ L for all i and j ≤ k. Then by Proposition 3 we have
vX1,Y1 + . . . + vXj ,Yj = 0
with vi = vXi,Yi ∈ I(G) so (15) holds. On the other hand, if (15) is satisfied for
∑m
I=1 ai ≤ k,
then vi = vXi,Yi for some Xi ∈W and Yi ∈ L and the sequence
(Xa11 , . . . ,X
am
m ;Y
a1
1 , . . . , Y
am
m ),
where Xaii and Y
ai
i mean ai copies of Xi and Yi, respectively, is a trading transform violating
k-trade robustness.
Does there exist a positive integer k such that k-trade robustness impliy trade robustness?
Winder [24] showed that in general no such k exists. However, if we restrict ourselves with
games with n players, then the situation changes and, for each n, such a number exists. Of
course it will depend on n. This is an important result contained in the following theorem. (We
note though that the equivalence of (a) and (b) was earlier proved by Elgot [3].)
Theorem 1 (Taylor-Zwicker, 1992). The following two conditions are equivalent:
• G is weighted majority game,
• G is trade robust,
• G is 22n-trade robust.
As this characterisation of weighted games implies, to show that the game G is not weighted
majority game, it is sufficient to present a trading transform (12) where all coalitions X1, . . . ,Xj
are winning and all coalitions Y1, . . . , Yj are losing. We will call such a trading transform a
certificate of non-weightedness of G. An interesting question immediately emerges: if we want
to check weightedness of a game with n players what is the maximal length of certificates that
we have to check?
Let G = (P,W ) be a simple game with |P | = n. If G is not weighted we define f(G) to
be the smallest positive integer k such that G is not k-trade robust. If G is weighted we set
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f(G) = ∞. The larger the value f(G) the closer is the game G to a weighted majority game.
Let us also define
f(n) = max
G
f(G),
where maximum is taken over non roughly-weighted games with n players. We can also say
that f(n) is the smallest positive integer such that f(n)-trade robustness for an n-player game
implies its weightedness.
Example 4. In Example 3 the corresponding 7× 7 matrix, composed of vectors vXi,Xci ∈ I(G),
i = 1, . . . , 7, will be: 

1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1
−1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1
1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 1
−1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1
−1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1
−1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1


.
Its rows sum to the vector (−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1). If we also add the vector vP,∅ =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) we will get
7∑
i=1
vXi,Xci + vP,∅ = 0.
This means that the following eight winning coalitions (X1, . . . ,X7, P ), where P is the grand
coalition, can be transformed into the following eight losing coalitions: (Xc1 , . . . ,X
c
7 , ∅) (note
that ∅ = P c). The sequence
(X1, . . . ,X7, P ;X
c
1 , . . . ,X
c
7 , ∅) (16)
is a certificate of non-weightedness of G. This certificate is not however the shortest. Indeed, if
we take two lines, say, {1, 2, 3} and {3, 4, 5} and swap 2 and 4, then {1, 3, 4} and {2, 3, 5} will
not be lines, hence losing coalitions. Thus, Fano is not 2-trade robust and f(Fano) = 2.
Theorem 1 gives us an upper bound for f(n). The following theorem gives a lower bound.
Theorem 2 (Taylor-Zwicker, 1995). For each integer m ≥ 2, there exists a game Gabm, called
Gabelman’s game, with (m+ 1)2 players, that is m-trade robust but not (m+ 1)-trade robust.
Summarising the results of Theorems 1 and 2 in terms of function f we may state
Corollary 1. For any n ≥ 2,
⌊√n⌋ ≤ f(n) ≤ 22n . (17)
As Taylor and Zwicker noted in [21] for most non-weighted games the value of f(n) is 2.
The closer the game to a weighted majority game the longer is the certificate and it is harder
to find it.
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5 A new upper bound for f
In what follows we use the following notation. Let x ∈ Rn. Then we write x≫ 0 iff xi > 0 for
all i = 1, . . . , n. We also write x > 0 iff xi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n with this inequality being
strict for at least one i, and x ≥ 0 iff xi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. In this section we will need the
following result which may be considered as a folklore.
Theorem 3. Let A be an m×n matrix with rational coefficients with rows ai ∈ Qn, i = 1, . . . ,m.
Then the system of linear inequalities Ax ≫ 0, x ∈ Rn, has no solution iff there exist non-
negative integers r1, . . . , rm, of which at least one is positive, such that
r1a1 + r2a2 + · · · + rmam = 0. (18)
A proof can be found in [21], Theorem 2.6.4, p. 71 or in [15], Lemma 7.2.1, p. 192.
Theorem 4. The following statements for a simple game G with n players are equivalent:
(a) G is weighted,
(b) G is N -trade robust for N = (n+ 1)2
1
2
n log2 n.
Proof. We only need to prove that (b) implies (a). Suppose G is not weighted. Then by
Proposition 2 the system of inequalities
v · x > 0, v ∈ I(G),
is inconsistent. By Theorem 3 there exist vectors v1, . . . ,vm ∈ I(G) and non-negative integers
r1, . . . , rm such that r1v1+ r2v2+ · · ·+ rmvm = 0. Let m be minimal with this property. Then
all ri’s are non-zero, hence positive. By a standard linear algebra argument (see, e.g. Theorem
2.11 from [8]) we may then assume thatm ≤ n+1 and that the system of vectors {v1, . . . ,vm−1}
is linearly independent. We will assume that m = n + 1 as it is the worst case scenario. Let
A = (a1 a2 . . . an+1) be the (n + 1)×n matrix, which ith row is ai = vi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1.
The null-space of the matrix A is one-dimensional, and since (r1, . . . , rn+1) is in it, then the
coordinates in any solution are either all positive or all negative. Looking for a solution of
the system x1v1 + . . . + xnvn = −vn+1, by Cramer’s rule we find xi = detAi/detA, where
A = (a1 . . . an) and Ai is obtained when ai in A is replaced with an+1. Thus
detA1 a1 + . . . + detAn an + detAan+1 = 0 (19)
and by Hadamard’s inequality [9] we have detAi ≤ nn/2 = 2 12n log2 n. The sum of all coefficients
is smaller than or equal to (n + 1)2
1
2
n log2 n = N . Since G is N -trade robust this is impossible
by Proposition 3.
Corollary 2. f(n) ≤ (n+ 1)2 12n log2 n.
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6 A new lower bound for f(n)
Let w = (w1, . . . , wn) be a vector with non-negative coordinates. There may be some linear
relations between the coordinates of w. Let us define those relations that will be important
for us. Let X,Y be subsets of [n] such that Xi ∩ Yi = ∅. If vX,Y · w = 0, which is the same
as
∑
i∈X wi −
∑
j∈Y wj = 0, then we say that the coordinates of w are in the relation which
corresponds to the vector v = vX,Y ∈ T n.
Given X ⊆ [n] we may then introduce w(X) = ∑i∈X wi. For two subsets X,Y ⊆ [n] we
write X ∼ Y if w(X) = w(Y ). Of course, if this happens, then the coordinates of w satisfy the
equation vX,Y ·w = 0. Suppose X ∼ Y , then the equivalence X ′ ∼ Y ′, where X ′ = X \ (X ∩Y )
and Y ′ = Y \(X∩Y ) will be called primitive and X ∼ Y will be called a consequence of X ′ ∼ Y ′.
Example 5. Consider the vector of weights w = (w1, w2, w3, w4, w5) = (1, 2, 5, 6, 10). Then
w1 + w3 = w4, w1 + w4 = w2 + w3, w2 + w5 = w1 + w3 + w4, w3 + w4 = w1 + w5 (20)
are relations which correspond to vectors
(1, 0, 1,−1, 0), (1,−1,−1, 1, 0), (−1, 1,−1,−1, 1), (−1, 0, 1, 1,−1), (21)
respectively. It is easy to check that there are no other relations between the coordinates of w.
(Note that we do view w1 + w2 + w3 = w2 + w4 and w1 + w3 = w4 as the same relation.)
We have3
Primitive equivalence Total weight of equal subsets
13 ∼ 4 6
14 ∼ 23 7
25 ∼ 134 12
34 ∼ 15 11
Apart from these four equivalences and their consequences there are no other equivalences.
Definition 7. Let w = (w1, . . . , wn) be a vector of non-negative coordinates. We will say that
w satisfies kth Fishburn’s condition if there exist distinct vectors vi = vXi,Yi ∈ T n, i = 1, . . . , k,
with Xi ∩ Yi = ∅, such that:
• Xi ∼ Yi for i = 1, . . . , k, that is vi ·w = 0 is a relation for the coordinates of w.
• Apart from v1, . . . ,vk there are no other relations.
• ∑ki=1 vi = 0,
3Here and below we omit curly brackets in the set notation
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• No proper subset of vectors of the system {v1, . . . ,vk} is linearly dependent.
For us the importance of this condition is shown in the following
Theorem 5. Let w = (w1, . . . , wn), n > 2, be a vector with positive coordinates which satisfies
the kth Fishburn condition. Then there exists a simple game on n+ k players which is (k − 1)-
trade robust but not k-trade robust.
Proof. Suppose vectors vi = vXi,Yi ∈ T n, i = 1, . . . , k are those that are required for the
kth Fishburn condition. Then by Proposition 3 the sequence T = (X1, . . . ,Xk;Y1, . . . , Yk) is a
trading transform. Let w(X) be the total weight of the coalition X. Then we have si = w(Xi) =
w(Yi) for i = 1, . . . , k. Let N be any positive integer greater than 2w(P ).
We define
P ′ = P ∪ {n + 1, . . . , n+ k}, X ′i = Xi ∪ {n+ i}, Y ′i = Yi ∪ {n+ i}.
Then T1 = (X ′1 . . . ,X ′k;Y ′1 . . . , Y ′k) is obviously also a trading transform. Let us give weight
N − si to n+ i. We will call these new elements heavy. Then
w(X ′1) = . . . = w(X
′
k) = w(Y
′
1) = . . . = w(Y
′
k) = N.
Moreover, we are going to show that no other subset of P ′ has weightN . Suppose there is a subset
Z ⊂ P ′ whose total weight is N and which is different from any of the X ′1, . . . X ′k and Y ′1 , . . . Y ′k.
Since N > 2w(P ) and 2N − si − sj ≥ 2N − 2w(P ) > N holds for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then Z
must contains no more than one heavy element, say Z contains n+ i. Then for Z ′ = Z \ {n+ i}
we have w(Z ′) = N − (N − si) = si which implies Z ′ = Xi or Z ′ = Yi, a contradiction.
Let us now consider the game G on [n] with rough voting representation [N ;w1, . . . , wn],
where X ′1, . . . X
′
k are winning and Y
′
1 , . . . Y
′
k are losing. Since these are the only subsets on the
threshold, the game is fully defined. T1 becomes a certificate of non-weightedness for G so it is
not k-trade robust. Let us prove that it is (k − 1)-trade robust. Suppose on the contrary, there
exists a certificate of non-weightedness for G
T2 = (U1, . . . , Us;V1, . . . , Vs), s ≤ k − 1, (22)
where U1, . . . , Us are all winning and V1, . . . , Vs are all losing. Then this can happen only if all
these vectors are on the threshold, that is,
w(U1) = . . . = w(Us) = w(V1) = . . . = w(Vs) = N,
hence Ui ∈ {X ′1, . . . X ′k} and Vj ∈ {Y ′1 , . . . Y ′k}. As was proved, any of Ui and any of Vj contain
exactly one heavy player. Suppose, without loss of generality that U1 = X
′
i1
= Xi1 ∪ {n + i1}.
Then we must have at least one player n+ i1 among the V1, . . . , Vs. Without loss of generality
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we may assume that V1 = Y
′
i1
= Yi1 ∪ {n + i1}. We may now cancel n + i1 from the trading
transform (22) obtaining a certificate of non-weightedness
T3 = (Xi1 , U2, . . . , Us;Yi1 , V2, . . . , Vs).
Continuing this way we will come to a certificate of non-weightedness
T4 = (Xi1 , . . . ,Xis ;Yi1 , . . . , Yis),
which by Proposition 3 will give us v1+ . . .+vs = 0. The latter contradicts to the fact that no
proper subset of vectors of the system {v1, . . . ,vk} is linearly dependent.
Fishburn proved the following combinatorial lemma which plays the key role in our construc-
tion of games.
Lemma 1 (Fishburn, 1997). For every n ≥ 5 there exists a vector of weights w = (w1, . . . , wn)
which satisfies the (n− 1)-th Fishburn condition.
Proof. See [4, 5].
Corollary 3. For each integer n ≥ 5, there exists a game with 2n−1 players, that is (n−2)-trade
robust but not (n− 1)-trade robust. Moreover, n− 1 ≤ f(2n− 1). For an arbitrary n⌊
n− 1
2
⌋
≤ f(n). (23)
Proof. The first part follows immediately from Theorem 5 and Lemma 1. Indeed, in this case the
length of the shortest certificate of non-weightedness is n−1. We also trivially have n−1 ≤ f(2n).
These two inequalities can be combined into one inequality (23).
Example 6 (Continuation of Example 6). Suppose P = [9]. The first five players get weights
(w1, w2, w3, w4, w5) = (1, 2, 5, 6, 10). The other four players get weights (w6, w7, w8, w9) =
(106, 105, 100, 101). Then we get the following equivalences:
Equivalence Total weight of subsets
136 ∼ 46 6+106= 112
147 ∼ 237 7+105= 112
258 ∼ 1348 12+100= 112
349 ∼ 159 11+101= 112
We define
• Coalitions whose total weight is > 112 are winning.
• Coalitions whose total weight is < 112 are losing.
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• 46, 237, 1348, 159 are winning.
• 136, 147, 258, 349 are losing.
This gives us a game with a shortest certificate of length 4, that is, f(9) ≥ 4. Gabelman’s
example gives f(9) ≥ 3.
Fishburn [4, 5] conjectured that a system of n weights cannot satisfy a n′th Fishburn con-
dition for n′ ≥ n. This appeared to be not the case. Conder and Slinko [2] showed that a
system of 7 weights can satisfy 7th Fishburn condition. Conder4 checked that this is also the
case for 7 ≤ n ≤ 13. Marshall [13] introduced a class of optimus primes and showed that if p
is such a prime then a system of p weights satisfying pth Fishburn condition exists. Although
computations show that optimus primes are quite numerous [13], it is not known if there are
infinitely many of them. The definition of an optimus prime is too technical to give it here.
Corollary 4. For each integer 7 ≤ n ≤ 13 and also for any n which is an optimus prime, there
exists a game with 2n players, that is (n − 1)-trade robust but not n-trade robust. Moreover,
n ≤ f(2n) for such n.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 5 along the lines of Corollary 3.
7 A criterion for rough weightedness
The following result that we need in this section is not new either. Kraft et al [12] outlined the
idea of its proof without much details. Since this result is of fundamental importance to us, we
give a full proof in the appendix.
Theorem 6. Let A be an m × n matrix with rational coefficients. Let ai ∈ Qn, i = 1, . . . ,m
be the rows of A. Then the system of linear inequalities Ax ≥ 0 has no non-negative solution
x ≥ 0, other than x = 0, iff there exist non-negative integers r1, . . . , rm and a vector u whose
all entries are positive integers such that
r1a1 + r2a2 + · · ·+ rmam + u = 0. (24)
Definition 8. A certificate of non-weightedness, which includes P and ∅ we will call potent.
We saw such a certificate in (16) for Fano plane game. Now we can give a criterion for a
game to be roughly weighted.
Theorem 7 (Criterion of rough weightedness). The game G with n players is roughly weighted
if one of the two equivalent statements hold:
4Reported in [13]
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(a) for no positive integer j ≤ (n+1)2 12n log2 n there exist a potent certificate of non-weightedness
of length j,
(b) for no positive integer j ≤ (n+1)2 12n log2 n there exist j vectors v1, . . . ,vj ∈ I(G) such that
v1 + . . .+ vj + 1 = 0, (25)
where 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1).
Proof. Since 1 = vP,∅, by Proposition 3 we know that (a) and (b) are equivalent. We also note
that, as in Theorem 4, it can be shown that if a relation (25) holds in an n-player game for some
j, then there is another such relation with j ≤ (n + 1)2 12n log2 n.
Suppose that (25) is satisfied but G is roughly weighted. By Proposition 2 this means that
the system
vi · x ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , j
has a non-zero non-negative solution, let us call it also x0. Then
0 = (v1 + . . . + vj + 1) · x0 ≥ |x0| > 0,
where |x| denotes the sum of all coordinates of x. This is a contradiction.
Let us suppose now that a system of rough weights for the game G does not exist. Then
the system (10) has no solution and by Theorem 6 there exist vectors v1, . . . ,vm ∈ I(G) and a
vector u whose all coordinates are positive integers and such that
v1 + . . .+ vm + u = 0 (26)
(where not all of the vectors vi may be different). Let us consider the relation (26) with the
smallest sum |u| = u1 + . . . + un of coordinates of u. If |u| = n we are done. Suppose ui > 1
for some i ∈ [n]. Then we can find j ∈ [n] such that the ith coordinate of vj is −1. Then
v′j = vj + ei ∈ I(G) and we can write
v1 + . . .+ v
′
j + . . .+ vm + u
′ = 0,
where u′ = u− ei. Since all coordinates of u′ are positive integers and their sum is |u| − 1 this
contradicts to the minimality of |u|.
The game Fano can be generalised in several different ways. We will consider two such
generalisations.
Example 7 (Hadamard games). An Hadamard matrix H of order n×n is a matrix with entries
±1 such that HTH = HHT = In, where In is the identity matrix of order n. The latter condition
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is equivalent to the system of rows of H as well as the system of columns being orthogonal. The
standard example of Hadamard matrices is the sequence
H1 =
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, Hk+1 =
(
Hk Hk
Hk −Hk
)
(27)
discovered by Sylvester in 1867 [18]. Here Hk is 2
k×2k matrix. It is known that the order of an
Hadamard matrix must be divisible by four and the hypothesis is being tested that for any k an
Hadamard matrix of order 4k exists. However it has not been proven and the smallest k number
for which it is not known whether or not an Hadamard matrix of order 4k exists is currently
167 [11].
Suppose now that an Hadamard matrtix of order n > 4 exists. In a usual way (by multiplying
certain rows and columns by −1, if necessary) we may assume that all integers in the first row and
in the first column of H are 1. Then we consider the matrix H which is H without its first row
and its first column. The game HGn−1 = (P,W ) will be defined on the set of players P = [n−1].
We consider the rows of H and view them as the characteristic vectors of subsets X1, . . . ,Xn−1.
Any two rows of H are orthogonal which implies that the number of places where these two rows
differ are equal to the number of places where they coincide. However, if Xi ∩Xj = ∅, then the
number of places where the two rows differ would be 2(n/2−1) = n−2 which is greater than n/2
for n > 4. Hence Xi ∩Xj 6= ∅ for any i, j. Let us consider X1, . . . ,Xn−1 as minimal winning
coalitions of HGn−1. It is easy to see that the Hadamard game HG7 obtained from H3 is the
Fano plane game.
Definition 9. A game with n players will be called cyclic if the charactiristic vectors of minimal
winning coalitions consist of a vector w ∈ Zn2 and all its cyclic permutations. We will denote it
C(w).
It is not difficult to see that the game Fano in Example 3 is cyclic.
Theorem 8. Suppose that the Hamming weight of w ∈ Zn2 is smaller than n/2. Suppose the
game C(w) is proper. Then it is not roughly weighted.
Proof. Let X1, . . . ,Xn correspond to the characteristic vectors, which are w and all its cyclic
permutations. Suppose that the Hamming weight of w is k. Then the sequence
T = (X1, . . . ,Xn, P, . . . , P︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−2k
;Xc1 , . . . ,X
c
n, ∅, . . . , ∅︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−2k
)
is a trading transform. Since the game is proper, X1, . . . ,Xn ∈ W and Xc1, . . . ,Xcn ∈ L. Thus
by Theorem 7 the game C(w) is not roughly weighted.
Richardson [16] studied the following class of games that generalise the Fano game. Let
q = pr, where p is prime. Let GF (q) be the Galois field with q elements and PG(n, q) be the
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projective n-dimensional space over GF (q). It is known [16, 14] that PG(n, q) contains q
n+1−1
q−1
points and any its (n−1)-dimensional subspace consists of qn−1q−1 points. Any two such subspaces
have q
n−1−1
q−1 points in their intersection.
We define a game Prn,q = (PG(n, q),W ) by defining the set W
m of all minimal winning
coalition be the set of all (n − 1)-dimensional subspaces of PG(n, q). This class of games is
known as projective games. These games are cyclic by Singer’s theorem (see, e.g., [14], p. 156).
Corollary 5. Any projective game is not roughly weighted.
Proof. We note that, since any two winning coalitions of Prn,q intersect, this game is proper.
By Singer’s Theorem any projective game Prn,q is cyclic. Now the statement follows from
Theorem 8.
8 AT-LEAST-HALF Property
We can also characterise rough weightedness in terms of EL sequences similar to Theorem 2.4.6
of [21]. We remind to the reader that a coalition is blocking if it is a complement of a losing
coalition. A sequence of coalitions (Z1, . . . , Z2k) is called an EL sequence of degree k (see [21],
p. 61) if half of its coalitions are winning and half are blocking.
Definition 10. A simple game satisfies AT-LEAST-HALF PROPERTY of degree k if any EL
sequence of degree k or less has some player occurring in at least half of the coalitions in the
sequence.
Theorem 9. For a simple game G the following are equivalent:
(i) G is roughly weighted.
(ii) G has at-least-half property of degree (n + 1)2
1
2
n log2 n.
Proof. Suppose G is roughly weighted and let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be its rough voting representation.
Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Z2k) be an EL sequence. Then any winning coalition in Z has weight of at
least q and any blocking coalition in Z has weight of at least Σ − q, where Σ = ∑ni=1wi. The
total weight of coalitions in Z is therefore at least kq + k(Σ − q) = kΣ. If (ii) is not satisfied,
then any player occurs in the sequence less than k times and the total weight of coalitions in Z
is therefore strictly less than
∑n
i=1 kwi = kΣ, which is a contradiction. Hence (i) implies (ii).
Suppose now that (ii) is satisfied but G is not roughly weighted. Then there exist a potent
certificate of non-weightedness
T = (X1, . . . ,Xk, P ;Y1, . . . , Yk, ∅),
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where k ≤ (n + 1)2 12n log2 n. Then the sequence Z = (X1, . . . ,Xk;Y c1 , ..., Y ck ) is an EL sequence.
Consider an arbitrary player a. For a certain positive integer s it occurs s times in the sub-
sequence Z ′ = (X1, . . . ,Xk, P ) and s times in the subsequence Z
′′ = (Y1, . . . , Yk, ∅). Thus in
Z it will occur (s − 1) + (k − s) = k − 1 times, which is less than half of 2k and at-least-half
property does not hold. By the Criterion of rough weightedness (Theorem 7) we conclude that
G is roughly weighted.
9 Function g.
Suppose now that we have to check if a game G is roughly weighted or not. According to the
Criterion of Rough Weightedness (Theorem7) we have to check if there are any potent certificates
of non-weightedness. We have to know where to stop while checking those. We will define a new
function for this. If the game is roughly weighted let us set g(G) = ∞. Alternatively, g(G) is
the length of the shortest potent certificate of non-weightedness for G. We also define a function
g(n) = max
G
g(G),
where maximum is taken over non roughly-weighted games with n players. Checking rough
weightedness we then have to check all potent certificates of non-weightedness up to a length
g(n).
For the Fano plane game in Example 3 we have a potent certificate of non-weightedness (16)
which has length 8. We will prove that this is the shortest potent certificate for this game.
Theorem 10. g(Fano) = 8.
Proof. We claim that any v ∈ I(G) has the sum of coefficients |v| = v1+ . . .+ vn ≥ −1. Indeed,
such a vector would be of the form v = vX,Y , where X is winning and Y is losing. Since X is
winning v has at least three positive ones and since Y is losing it has at most four negative ones
(as all coalitions of size five are winning).
Suppose now there is a sum
v1 + . . . + vj + 1 = 0,
where vi ∈ I(G), which represents a potent certificate of non-weightedness of length less than
eight. In this case j ≤ 6. By the observation above the sum of coefficients of vectors v1, . . . ,v6
is at least −6. Since the sum of coefficients of 1 is seven, we obtain a contradiction.
Theorem 11. f(HGn) = 2 and g(HGn) = n+ 1 for all n.
Proof. Repeats the respective proofs of for Fano.
Let us now deal with the lower and upper bounds for g.
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Theorem 12. For any n > 5
2n+ 3 6 g(n) 6 (n + 1)2
1
2
n log2 n.
Proof. Due to Theorem 7 we need only to take care of the lower bound. For this we need to
construct a game G with n players such that g(G) = 2n+ 3.
Let us define the game Gn,2 = ([n],W ) where
• {1, 2} ∈W and {3, 4, 5} ∈W ;
• if |S| > 3 then S ∈W.
Note that all losing coalition have cardinality at most three.
We note that the trading transform
T ={{1, 2}n, {3, 4, 5}n+2, P ; {2, 3, 5}3 , {2, 3, 4}3 ,
{2, 3, 6}, . . . , {2, 3, n}︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−5
, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}n−1 , ∅}
is a potent certificate of non-weightedness for G. Its length 2n + 3 is minimal. To prove this
we will use the idea introduced in the proof of Theorem 10. Since all losing coalition have
cardinality at most three, any v ∈ I(G) has the sum of coordinates v1+ . . .+ vn ≥ −1 and that
all such vectors v with v1 + . . . + vn = −1 have the form v{1,2},Y for Y being a losing 3-player
coalition.
Suppose now there is a sum
v1 + . . . + vk + 1 = 0,
where vi ∈ I(G), which represents a potent certificate T = (X1, . . . ,Xk, P ;Y1, . . . , Yk, ∅). Due
to the comment above, at least n vectors among v1, . . . ,vk must have the sum of coordinates
−1 and hence be of the form v{1,2},Y , where Y is a losing 3-player coalition. This means that
there are at least n sets {1, 2} among X1, . . . ,Xk. Add the grand coalition and we obtain that
the union X1 ∪ . . . ∪ Xk ∪ P has at least n + 1 elements 1 and at least n + 1 elements 2. At
the same time no losing coalition can contain both 1 and 2. Hence we will need at least 2n + 2
losing coalitions Y1, . . . , Yk to achieve the equality X1 ∪ . . . ∪Xk ∪ P = Y1 ∪ . . . ∪ Yk ∪ ∅. Hence
T is minimal.
10 Further properties of functions f and g.
What can we say about the relation between f(n) and g(n)? One thing that can be easily
observed is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 13. f(n) ≤ g(n)− 1.
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Proof. Suppose g(n) is finite and there is a sum
v1 + . . . + vm + 1 = 0, m = g(n)− 1,
where vi ∈ I(G), which represents a potent certificate of non-weightedness of length g(n). We
will show that v1, . . . ,vm can absorb 1 = e1+ . . .+en and remain in I(G). Let us start with e1.
One of the vectors, say vi, will have −1 in the first position. Then we replace vi with vi + e1.
The new vector is again in I(G). It is clear that we can continue absorbing ei’s until all are
absorbed.
Let us talk about duality in games. The dual game of a game G = (P,W ) is defined to be
G∗ = (P,Lc). This is to say that in the game G∗ dual to a game G the winning coalitions are
exactly the complements of losing coalitions of G.
Shapley [23] proved that for any simple game G:
(a) G = G∗∗.
(b) G∗ is proper if and only if G is strong.
(c) G∗ is strong if and only if G is proper.
The operation of taking the dual is known to preserve both weightedness and rough weightedness
[21]. These well-known facts we will sometimes use without quoting them formally.
Theorem 14. Let g be a simple game, then f(G) = f(G∗) and g(G) = g(G∗).
Proof. Firstly, we shall prove the statement about f . Let G = (P,W ) be a simple game and
T = (X1, . . . ,Xk;Y1, . . . , Yk) be a certificate of non-weightedness of G, then a sequence of even
length T ∗ = (Y c1 , . . . , Y ck ;Xc1 , . . . ,Xck) will be a trading transform for G∗. Indeed, it is not
difficult to see that Xc1, . . . ,X
c
k are loosing coalitions in G
∗ and Y c1 , . . . , Y
c
k are winning. Hence
f(G) ≤ f(G∗). However, due to Theorem 1 (a) we have f(G∗) ≤ f(G∗∗) = f(G). Proof of the
second part of the theorem is similar.
11 Games with a small number of players
Definition 11. We say that a player in a game is a dictator if a coalition is winning if and
only if this player belongs to it. If all coalitions containing a particular player are winning (but
there may be other winning coalitions), this player is called a weak dictator. A player will be
called a vetoer if she is contained in the intersection of all winning coalitions.
Proposition 5. Suppose G is a simple game with n players. Then G is roughly weighted if any
one of the following three conditions holds:
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(a) G has a weak dictator.
(b) G has a vetoer.
(c) G has a losing coalition that consists of n− 1 players.
Proof. To prove (a) we simply give weight 1 to the weak dictator and 0 to everybody else.
The rough quota must be set to 0 (this is possible since we have a non-zero weight). To prove
(b) suppose that v is a vetoer for this game and that there exists a potent certificate of non-
representability
T = (X1, . . . ,Xk, P ;Y1, . . . , Yk, ∅), (28)
Then v belongs to all winning coalitions X1, . . . ,Xk, P of this trading transform but it cannot
belong to all losing coalitions since ∅ does not contain v. This contradiction proves (b). Part
(c) follows from (b) since if Y is a losing coalition of size n − 1, then the player v such that
{v} = P \ Y is a vetoer.
Theorem 15. Let G be a simple proper game with n players. If G has a two-player winning
coalition, then G is a roughly weighted game.
Proof. Suppose G has a two-player winning coalition. Players from this coalition we will call
heavy. Since G is proper every winning coalition X must contain at least one heavy player and
any losing coalition Y can contain at most one. Then a potent certificate of non-weightedness
(28) cannot exist since all coalitions X1, . . . ,Xk, P will contain at least k+2 heavy players while
coalitions Y1, . . . , Yk, ∅ will contain at most k. Therefore G is roughly weighted.
Corollary 6. Let G be a simple strong game with n players. If G has a losing coalition of
cardinality n− 2, then G is a roughly weighted game.
Proof. The dual game G∗ is proper and it will have a two-player winning coalition, hence Theo-
rem 15 implies this corollary since the operation of taking a dual game preserves rough weight-
edness.
Proposition 6. Every game with n 6 4 players is a roughly weighted game.
Proof. It is obvious for n = 1, 2, 3 as all games in this case are known to be weighted. Let G
be a 4-player simple game. If G has a one-player winning coalition it is roughly weighted by
Proposition 5(a). Also, if G has a 3-player losing coalition, it is roughly weighted by Propo-
sition 5(c). Thus we may assume that all winning coalitions have at least two players and all
losing coalitions have at most two players.
Suppose, that there is a potent certificate of non-weightedness of the form (28). As we
mentioned, we may assume that |Xi| ≥ 2 and |Yi| ≤ 2 for every i = 1, . . . , k. But in this case
the multisets X1 ∪ . . . ∪Xk ∪ P and Y1 ∪ . . . ∪ Yk ∪ ∅ have different cardinalities and cannot be
equal which is a contradiction.
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Theorem 16. Any simple game G with five players, which is either proper or strong, is a
roughly weighted game.
Proof. Assume on the contrary that there exists a game G = ([5],W ), which is not roughly
weighted. It means that there is a potent certificate of non-weightedness (28). As in the proof
of the previous theorem we may assume that |Xi| ≥ 2 and |Yi| ≤ 3 for all i = 1, . . . , k. We note
that there must exist i ∈ [k] such that |Xi| = 2. If this does not hold, then |Xi| ≥ 3 for all i
and the multisets X1 ∪ . . .∪Xk ∪P and Y1 ∪ . . .∪ Yk ∪ ∅ cannot be equal. Similarly, there must
exist j ∈ [k] for which |Yj | = 3. Now by Theorem 15 in the proper case and its corollary in the
strong case we deduce that G is roughly weighted.
The following example shows that the requirement for the game to be strong or proper
cannot be discarded.
Example 8 (Game with five players that is not roughly weighted). We define the game G =
(P,W ), where P = [5], by defining the set of minimal winning coalitions to be
Wm = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}}.
Then the trading transform
T = {{1, 2}5, {3, 4, 5}7 , P ; {2, 3, 5}4 , {2, 3, 4}2 , {1, 3, 4}2 , {1, 4, 5}4 , ∅}. (29)
is a potent certificate of non-weightedness. Indeed, all four coalitions {2, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 4},
{1, 4, 5} are losing since they do not contain {1, 2} or {3, 4, 5}.
We note that any simple constant sum game with five players is weighted [22].
Theorem 17. Any simple constant sum game with six players is roughly weighted.
Proof. Assume on the contrary, that G doesn’t have rough weights. Then there is a a potent
certificate of non-weightedness of the form (28). Because G is proper, by Theorem 15 every Xi
has at least three elements. As G is also strong, so by Corollary 6 every Yj contains at most three
elements. However, it is impossible to find such trading transform T under these constraints
since multisets X1 ∪ . . . ∪Xk ∪ P and Y1 ∪ . . . ∪ Yk ∪ ∅ have different cardinalities.
Example 9 (Proper game with six players that is not roughly weighted). We define G = (P,W ),
where P = [6]. Let the set of minimal winning coalitions be
Wm = {{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}, {1, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 6}, {1, 2, 6}}.
A potent certificate of non-weightedness for this game is
T = ({1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}2 , {1, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 6}, {1, 2, 6}, P ; {1, 2, 4, 5}2 , {1, 3, 4, 6}2 , {2, 3, 5, 6}2 , ∅).
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12 Conclusion and further research
In this paper we proved a criterion of existence of rough weights in the language of trading
transforms similar to the criterion of existence of ordinary weights given by Taylor and Zwicker
[19]. We defined two functions f(n) and g(n) which measure the deviation of a simple game
from a weighted majority game and roughly weighted majority game, respectively. We improved
the upper and lower bounds for f(n) and obtain upper and lower bounds for g(n).
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 6. In one direction the statement is clear: if a linear combination (24) with
coefficients r1, . . . , rm exists, then there are no non-negative solutions for Ax ≥ 0, other than
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x = 0. Indeed, suppose s = (s1, . . . , sn) is such a solution. Denote r = (r1, . . . , rm). If
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ≥ 0 is a non-zero solution, then (24) implies (rA)x = s1x1 + . . . + snxn < 0,
which is impossible since r(Ax) ≥ 0.
Let us prove the reverse statement by induction. For n = 1 the matrix A is an m× 1 matrix
system reduces to a11x1 ≥ 0, . . . , am1x1 ≥ 0. Since it has no positive solutions we have ai1 < 0 for
some i. Suppose ai1 = − st , where s, t are integers and the fraction st is in lowest possible terms.
Then we can take ri = t and rj = 0 for j 6= i and obtain r1a1+r2a2+· · ·+rmam = tai1 = −s < 0
and s is an integer.
Suppose now that the statement is proved for all m×k matrices A with k < n. Suppose now
A is an m× n matrix and the system Ax ≥ 0 has no non-negative solutions other than x = 0.
Suppose that a certain column, say the jth one, has no positive coefficients. Then we may
drop this column and the resulting system will still have no non-zero non-negative solutions
(otherwise we can take it, add xj = 0, and obtain a non-zero non-negative solution for the
original system). By the induction hypothesis for the reduced system we can find non-negative
integers r1, . . . , rm and a vector u such that (24) is true. Then the same r1, . . . , rm will work
also for the original system.
We may now assume that any variable has positive coefficients. Let us consider the variable
x1. Its coefficients are not all negative but they are not all positive either (otherwise the system
would have a non-zero non-negative solution x = (1, 0, . . . , 0)). Multiplying, if necessary, the
rows of A by positive rational numbers, we find that our system is equivalent to a system of the
form
x1 − fi(x2, , . . . , xn) ≥ 0,
−x1 + gj(x2, , . . . , xn) ≥ 0,
hp(x2, , . . . , xn) ≥ 0,
i = 1, . . . , k, j = 1, . . . ,m, p = 1, . . . , ℓ, where fi(x2, , . . . , xn), gj(x2, , . . . , xn) and hp(x2, , . . . , xn)
are linear functions in x2, , . . . , xn, and k ≥ 1, m ≥ 1. The matrix of such system has the rows:
Ui = (1,ui), Vj = (−1,vj), Ws = (0,ws), where i = 1, . . . , k, j = 1, . . . ,m, s = 1, . . . , ℓ. Then
the following system of km+m+ ℓ inequalities
gi(x2, , . . . , xn) ≥ fj(x2, , . . . , xn),
gi(x2, , . . . , xn) ≥ 0,
hs(x2, , . . . , xn) ≥ 0,
i = 1, . . . , k, j = 1, . . . ,m, s = 1, . . . , ℓ, has no non-negative solutions other than x2 = . . . =
xn = 0. Indeed, if such a solution (x2, . . . , xn) is found then we can set x1 = min gi(x2, , . . . , xn)
and since this minimum is non-negative to obtain a non-zero solution of the original inequality.
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By the induction hypothesis there exist non-negative integers ai,j, dj , et, s, where i =
1, . . . , k, j = 1, . . . ,m, t = 1, . . . , ℓ such that at least one of these integers positive and
m∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
ai,j(ui + vj) +
m∑
j=1
djvj +
ℓ∑
t=1
etwt + s1 = 0, (30)
where s ∈ Rn−1 has all its coefficients non-negative. Let Bi =
∑m
j=1 ai,j, Cj =
∑k
i=1 ai,j,
d =
∑m
j=1 dj . Then
∑k
i=1Bi =
∑m
j=1Cj, and (30) can be rewritten as
k∑
j=1
BiUi +
m∑
j=1
(Cj + dj)Vj +
ℓ∑
t=1
etWt + de1 + (0, s1) = 0. (31)
If d 6= 0, then we have finished the proof. If not, then we found the numbers r11, . . . , r1m such
that
r11a1 + . . .+ r
1
mam + (0, s1) = 0. (32)
Similarly, we can find the numbers r21, . . . , r
2
m such that
r21a1 + . . .+ r
2
mam + (s2, 0) = 0. (33)
But then we can set ri = r
1
1 + r
2
1, i = 1, . . . ,m and s = (0, s1) + (s2, 0) and obtain (24). Now all
coordinates of s are positive, hence the statement is proved.
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